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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Lawrence Joseph Olson asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the opinion of
the Idaho Court of Appeals, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 766 (Ct. App. 2013)
(hereinafter, Opinion). He submits that the Court of Appeals' Opinion, which affirmed

the district court's order denying his petition for post-conviction relief, improperly held
that several arguments made in Mr. Olson's reply brief based were "new" arguments.
As such, it held that it could not consider those arguments.

However, since those

arguments were, in fact, presented in the appellant's brief and were made to rebut
arguments made by the State in its respondent's brief, they were properly before the
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Court of Appeals. As such, the Court of Appeals' Opinion was erroneous and contrary
to Idaho Supreme Court precedent. Therefore, this Court should grant review.
Assuming review is granted, Mr. Olson requests this Court reverse the order
denying his petition for review following the June 15, 2012, hearing. He contends that
he and his attorney were not given sufficient time to prepare for that hearing.
Additionally, he asserts that the hearing held on June 15, 2012, was substantively a
hearing on summary dismissal because he was not given a full and fair opportunity to
present evidence to support his allegations. As such, he contends that the district court
improperly summarily dismissed his petition when there were genuine issues of material
fact presented in that petition. Therefore, he requests that this Court remand this case
for an actual evidentiary hearing where Mr. Olson will be allowed a meaningful
opportunity to present evidence in support of his allegations.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Mr. Olson pied guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to driving under the influence,
with a persistent violator enhancement, and was sentenced to an indeterminate life
sentence, with seven years fixed.

(Tr., Vol.6, p.3, L.6 - p.4, L.11; R., Vol.1 p.5.) 1

As the current appeal is the second arising out of Mr. Olson's first petition for postconviction relief and the courts involved have been taking judicial notice of various
record documents and transcripts, there are multiple, independently bound and
paginated volumes containing the transcripts and record for this case. For example, in
the current appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court took judicial notice of the clerk's record
and reporter's transcripts from the first post-conviction appeal, Docket No. 38042.
(R., p.2.) To promote clarity, the record from Docket No. 38042 will be referred to as
"R., Vol.1," and the record prepared for this appeal (No. 40293) will be referred to as
"R., Vol.2."
The transcript volume from Docket No. 38042, which contains the transcript of
the summary dismissal hearing held on January 19, 2010, will be referred to as
"Tr., Vol.1." The volume from Docket No. 38042 containing the transcript of the
1
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Mr. Olson filed a direct appeal, asserting that his sentence was excessive; the Court of
Appeals affirmed his sentence.

State v. Olson, 2008 Unpublished Opinion No.748

(Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2008) (hereinafter, Olson /). Thereafter, Mr. Olson filed a petition for
post-conviction relief, which included a request for appointment of counsel. (See R.,
Vol.1, pp.5-28.) Without ruling on the request for counsel, the district court entered an
"Order Dismissing Petition for Post Conviction Relief" and gave Mr. Olson twenty days
to respond. (R., Vol.1, pp.40-44.) Mr. Olson filed an amended petition and renewed his
request for the appointment of counsel. (R., Vol.1, pp.45-50, 85-86.) The State moved
for summary dismissal of the amended petition. (R., Vol.1, pp.54-70.)
The district court dismissed most of Mr. Olson's claims, but, on the remaining
claims, it granted his request for representation and appointed counsel. (See R., Vol.1,
pp.40-50, 85-87.) Counsel filed a second amended petition asserting two arguments
that had not been summarily dismissed.

(R., Vol.1, pp.100-03.) The first claim was

based on the alleged failure of that attorney to advise Mr. Olson of his right to remain

evidentiary hearing held on August 20, 2010, will be referred to as "Tr., Vol.2." The
volume prepared for this appeal containing the transcript form the May 2, 2012, status
hearing will be referred to as "Tr., Vol.3," and the volume prepared for this appeal which
contains the transcript from the hearing "for Post Conviction Relief" (see R., Vol.2, p.5),
held on June 15, 2012, will be referred to as "Tr., Vol.4."
Additionally, the district court took judicial notice of the transcripts from the
underlying criminal case, including the transcript of the preliminary hearing, which are
included in the file from the direct appeal of the judgment of conviction (Docket No.
35049). (Tr., Vol.4, p.68, Ls.16-24; Tr., Vol.4, p.59, L.23 - p.60, L.6.) The Idaho
Supreme Court augmented the record with the transcript of the preliminary hearing and
took judicial notice of the transcripts of the May 2, 2012, scheduling conference and the
June 15, 2012, hearing (the nature of which is disputed in this appeal). (Order Granting
Motion to Augment the Record, dated April 17, 2013; Order Granting Motion Requesting
That The Court Take Judicial Notice, dated April 19, 2013.) To promote clarity, the
volume containing the transcript of the preliminary hearing will be referred to as
"Tr., Vol.5," and the volume containing the transcripts of the change of plea and
sentencing hearings will be referred to as 'Tr., Vol.6."
3

silent during the presentence investigation. (R., Vol.1, p.101.) The second alleged that
he had not voluntarily pied guilty due to his concern that the district court would impose
a harsher sentence if he went to trial. (R., Vol.1, p.101.) Those two claims were fully
litigated at that hearing and the district court ultimately denied them.

(R., Vol.1,

pp.130-31.)
Mr. Olson appealed, challenging the district court's summary dismissal of the
majority of his claims, as well as the denial of his two other claims.

(R., Vol.1,

pp.132-35.) The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the two fully-litigated issues,
but remanded the case in regard to the remainder of the issues because the district
court had improperly dismissed them before ruling on Mr. Olson's motion for counsel.
Olson v. State, 2012 Unpublished Opinion No.398, pp.5-6, 9 (Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2012)
(hereinafter, Olson //).
On remand, the district court appointed Mr. Olson counsel. (R., Vol.2, p.9.) At a
status hearing, it asked post-conviction counsel how much time he needed to be ready
to proceed.

(Tr., Vol.3, p. 3, L.3.)

Post-conviction counsel told the district court he

would need ninety days in order to be adequately prepared.

(See Tr., Vol.3, p.3,

Ls.4-5.) The district court flatly refused to give post-conviction counsel that much time,
setting the matter for a hearing some forty days out. (Tr., Vol.3, p.3, L.6 - p.4, L.11.) At
that subsequent hearing, Mr. Olson told the district court that he had not had sufficient
time to prepare for the hearing, and post-conviction counsel requested more time to
complete those preparations.

(Tr., Vol.4, p.12. L.25 - p.14, L.24; Tr., Vol.4, p.31,

L.22 - p.32, L.8.)
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The district court decided to proceed with the hearing for the purpose of
"narrow[ing] some of the issues down" on which the case would proceed, given postconviction counsel's representation that there were some issues Mr. Olson no longer
wished to pursue and based on the Court of Appeals' ruling. (Tr., Vol.4, p.18, Ls.6-7.)
As such, the district court stated:
Here's what the Court's going to order in this case ... I think the Court of
Appeals either wanted to give Mr. Olson an opportunity to either present
legal argument upon or evidence upon or to amend. And so I'm going
to -- I want to go through what is going to be pursued by Mr. Olson today,
and then what we're going to do is set this at a later date.
(Tr., Vol.4, p.17, L.7-17.) No witnesses besides Mr. Olson were called to testify at the
June 15, 2012, hearing. (See generally Tr., Vol.4.) Nevertheless, the district court later
described that hearing as an evidentiary hearing. 2 (R., Vol.2, p.130.)
Post-conviction counsel indicated to the district court that his intent was "to put
Mr. Olson on the stand and have him go through basically the original petition ... [to]
have Mr. Olson testify as to what kind of a basis he has for each one of those claims."
(Tr., Vol.4, p.11, L.19 - p.12, L.24.) The point of doing that, according to post-conviction
counsel, was to assist the district court "in elucidating what it is [Mr. Olson] wants
to ... assert here." (Tr., Vol.4, p.28, Ls.15-18.) The district court attempted to clarify
the claims in a discussion with post-conviction counsel instead.
Tr., Vol.4, p.18, L.10 - p.27, L.15.)

(See generally

When post-conviction counsel asked for the

opportunity to discuss answers in that regard with his client, the district court told him

The Register of Actions only describes this as a hearing "for Post Conviction Relief."
(See R., Vol.2, p.5.) However, the minutes from the status hearing on May 2, 2012,
indicate it was intended to be an evidentiary hearing. (Augmentation - Minutes from
May 2, 2012, hearing).

2
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"no."

(See, e.g., Tr., Vol.4, p.27, Ls.12-15.)

Ultimately, post-conviction counsel's

attempts to summarize the claims, which were less than clear, led the district court to
decide, "perhaps we ought to just go ahead and hear [Mr. Olson's] position on each of
these matters, and I can hear it out." (Tr., Vol.4, p.28, Ls.19-21.)
Mr. Olson proceeded to testify as to each of the claims raised in his original
petition. (See generally Tr., Vol.4, p.31, L.1 - p.94, L.24.) For example, in regard to
Issue B, Mr. Olson testified that his decision to plead guilty had been based on a
promise made by his first trial attorney regarding the sentence he would receive.
(Tr., Vol.4, p.39, L.19 - p.40, L.16.) The district court questioned him about that claim,
relying on the guilty plea questionnaire, and ultimately dismissed the claim based on the
information in the questionnaire.

(Tr., Vol.4, p.53, Ls.7-13; see generally Tr., Vol.4,

pp.41-54.)
In regard to Issue C, Mr. Olson clarified that his initial claim, which was that the
State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence, was more properly characterized as a
claim of ineffective assistance on the part of his first trial attorney for failing to
investigate a potential witness who, Mr. Olson asserted, would be able to give testimony
which he believed would undermine the reasonable suspicion for the initial traffic stop.
(Tr., Vol.4, p.54, Ls.3-23.)

The district court "dismissed" that claim because no

evidence was presented at the preliminary hearing which would support Mr. Olson's
assertion. (Tr., Vol.4, p.59, L.20 - p.60, L.6.)
In regard to Issue 0, Mr. Olson asserted that the district court erred by accepting
his guilty plea questionnaire because it was incomplete and indicated that Mr. Olson
had entered the plea based on a promise made to him. (R., Vol.1, p.8, 71-77.) The
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district court determined that he had not alleged a violation of his constitutional rights or
ineffective assistance of counsel in making that assertion, and "[a]s a matter of law, the
Court will dismiss that claim." (Tr., Vol.4, p.88, L.18 - p.89, L.4.)
After the June 15, 2012, hearing, the district court entered an order "denying"
Mr. Olson's post-conviction claims. (R., Vol.2, pp.13-14.) Mr. Olson filed a timely notice
of appeal from that order.

(R., Vol.2, pp.17-19.)

On appeal, Mr. Olson raised two

issues:
1.
Whether the district court erred by not affording Mr. Olson sufficient
time to discuss his potential claims with post-conviction counsel so that he
might develop them into viable post-conviction claims, which was the point
of the Court of Appeals' decision to remand this case following the initial,
inappropriate summary dismissal of those claims.
2.
Whether the district court erroneously summarily dismissed
Mr. Olson's petition for post-conviction relief in the face of at least one
genuine issue of material fact.
(App. Br., p.7.) In regard to the second issue, Mr. Olson argued that the substance of
the June 15, 2012, hearing indicated that it was a summary dismissal hearing, as
opposed to an evidentiary hearing. (App. Br., p.17.) As such, he argued that the district
court's order denying Mr. Olson's post-conviction claims (filed August 16, 2012) was
erroneous under the standards governing summary dismissal because Mr. Olson
sufficiently alleged a genuine issue of material fact.

(App. Br., pp.18-19.)

He also

argued that viewing the June 15, 2012, hearing as an evidentiary hearing would be
unreasonable because if it were an evidentiary hearing, it failed to afford him sufficient
notice or a meaningful opportunity to be heard. (App. Br., pp.18-19.)
In regard to that second issue, the State argued, in its respondent's brief, that the
June 15, 2012, hearing should be considered to be an evidentiary hearing, and that the
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August 16, 2012, order was not erroneous under the standards governing denial after
evidentiary hearings on post-conviction claims. (Resp. Br., pp.8-11.) However, it did
not actually address Mr. Olson's argument regarding the lack of due process.

(See

generally Resp. Br.)

Mr. Olson filed a reply brief. On the second issue on appeal, he rebutted the
State's assertion that the June 15, 2012, hearing should be considered an evidentiary
hearing. (Reply Br., pp.10-13.) He continued to assert both of the arguments he had
initially made in his appellant's brief to show the impropriety of the State's position.
(Reply Br., pp.13-16.) In fact, in making that argument, Mr. Olson cited many of the
same authorities that he had cited in his appellant's brief. (Compare App. Br., pp.18-19,
with Reply Br., pp.13-16.)

The Court of Appeals ultimately held that the June 15, 2012, hearing was an
evidentiary hearing, and so rejected Mr. Olson's arguments under the summary
dismissal standard. (Opinion, p.4.) When it turned to Mr. Olson's argument that such a
perspective was unreasonable given the lack of due process protections, the Court of
Appeals held that Mr. Olson's arguments "regarding the validity of the evidentiary
hearing" were new arguments in the reply brief, and so decided that it would not
consider them. (Opinion, p.4.) In a subsequent footnote, the Court of Appeals stated
that "Even if we were to consider the claims raised in [Mr.] Olson's reply brief, those
claims would detain us only for a moment," before summarily rejecting his arguments.
(Opinion, p.4 n.2.)
Mr. Olson filed a timely petition for review from that opinion.
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ISSUES
1.

Whether the Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion affirming the dismissal of
Mr. Olson's petition for post-conviction relief is in conflict with previous decisions
of the Idaho Supreme Court in that the decision fails to consider arguments
properly presented in the reply brief which were established in the appellant's
brief and made in rebuttal to arguments in the respondent's brief.

2.

Whether the district court erred by not affording Mr. Olson sufficient time to
discuss his potential claims with post-conviction counsel so that he might develop
them into viable post-conviction claims, which was the point of the Court of
Appeals' decision to remand this case following the initial, inappropriate summary
dismissal of those claims.

3.

Whether the district court erroneously summarily dismissed Mr. Olson's petition
for post-conviction relief in the face of at least one genuine issue of material fact.

9

ARGUMENT

I.
The Idaho Court Of Appeals' Opinion Affirming The Dismissal Of Mr. Olson's Petition
For Post-Conviction Relief Is In Conflict With Previous Decisions Of The Idaho Supreme
Court In That The Decision Fails To Consider Arguments Properly Presented In The
Reply Brief Which Were Established In The Appellant's Brief And Made In Rebuttal To
Arguments In The Respondent's Brief

A

Introduction
The Idaho Appellate Rules provide that petitions for review may be granted

only "when there are special and important reasons" for doing so but, ultimately, the
decision of whether to grant a given petition lies within the sound discretion of the
Supreme Court. I.AR. 118(b). This exercise of discretion is not completely unfettered.
Rule 118(b) provides a non-exhaustive list of five factors which must be considered in
evaluating any petition for review:
1)

Whether the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance not yet
decided by the Idaho Supreme Court;

2)

Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with precedent from
the Idaho Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court;

3)

Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with its own prior
decisions;

4)

Whether the Court of Appeals' actions are so unusual as to call for the
Supreme Court's exercise of its supervisory authority; and,

5)

Whether a majority of the Court of Appeals has certified that further
appellate review is desirable.

I.AR. 118(b). In this case, Mr. Olson contends that there are special and important
reasons for review to be granted. Primarily, the Court of Appeals failed to address the
issues properly presented on appeal, which means its decision was inconsistent with
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Idaho Supreme Court precedent. I.AR. 118(b)(2). For this reason, this Court should
exercise its review authority in this case.

B.

Mr. Olson's Arguments Regarding The Unreasonableness Of Viewing The
June 15, 2012, Hearing As An Evidentiary Hearing Based On The Lack Of Due
Process Afforded At That Hearing Were Properly Made In The Reply Brief
According to the Idaho Supreme Court, it "would be delinquent in its duties if it

failed to address the actual issues on appeal .... " Lovitt v. Robideaux, 139 Idaho 322,
328 (2003). When a matter is set for a substantive decision, the petitioner "can rightly
expect the matter will [proceed] on the issues framed by the pleadings."

See

Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 322 (1995). 3 The Court of Appeals did not

address some of the arguments presented on appeal based on its determination that,
"[i]n his reply brief, [Mr.] Olson, for the first time, makes several arguments regarding the
validity of the evidentiary hearing. This Court will not consider arguments raised for the
first time in the petitioner's reply brief." (Opinion, p.4.) Since that finding is wrong both
factually and legally, the Court of Appeals was delinquent in its duties because it failed
to address the actual issues on appeal.
The Court of Appeals' conclusion is factually mistaken because Mr. Olson made
the same arguments and offered authority in support in his appellant's brief.
Specifically, he argued that "the district court erroneously summarily dismissed
Mr. Olson's petition for post-conviction relief in the face of at least one genuine issue of
material fact." (App. Br., pp.14-19.) Mr. Olson's primary argument was that the June
15, 2012, hearing was properly considered as a summary dismissal hearing, not an
While Saykhamchone was specifically focused on the issues presented in a petition
for post-conviction relief, its rationale is equally applicable to the resolution of issues
presented in the appellate context.
3
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evidentiary hearing, and the August 16, 2012, order was erroneous under the standards
governing summary dismissal.

(App. Br., p.17.)

Mr. Olson also argued that the

alternative perspective - that the June 15, 2012, hearing was an evidentiary hearing was unreasonable because he was not provided with sufficient notice or a meaningful
opportunity to be heard at that hearing. (App. Br., p.17 n.9; pp.18-19.) These were the
same arguments made in the reply brief to rebut the State's contention that the June 15,
2012, hearing was an evidentiary hearing. (Resp. Br., pp.8-13; Reply Br., pp.13-16.)
The arguments in the reply brief even cited much of the same authority upon Mr. Olson
had relied in his appellant's brief. (Compare App. Br., pp.18-19, with Reply Br., pp.1316.) As such, the Court of Appeals' conclusion that these arguments were "new" in the
reply brief is factually incorrect. As such, its refusal to consider those arguments was
erroneous.
Legally, the Court of Appeals relied on the decision in Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho
706, 708 (2005), to support its decision to not consider Mr. Olson's due process
argument. In Suitts, the Idaho Supreme Court explained that the reason behind the rule
preventing consideration of issues raised for the first time in a reply brief: "A reviewing
court looks only to the initial brief on appeal for the issues presented because those are
the arguments and authority to which the respondent has an opportunity to respond in
the respondent's brief."

Id.

However, as discussed infra, the State did have an

opportunity to respond to the issue, arguments, and authority in regard to Mr. Olson's
alternative argument invoking due process.

Furthermore, the issue raised in the

appellant's brief was whether the district court's order was erroneous. (App. Br., p.7.)
That issue remained the same throughout all three briefs, and the State had the
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opportunity to respond to Mr. Olson's arguments on that issue, an opportunity of which it
took some advantage. 4 (Resp. Br., pp.8-11.) Therefore, the Court of Appeals' reliance
on Suitts is wholly misplaced.
Furthermore, the Idaho Appellate Rules allow that "[tJhe appellant or crossappellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the respondent or cross-respondent
within the time limit specified by Rule 34(c) which may contain additional argument in
rebuttal to the contentions of the respondent."

I.AR. 35(c) (emphasis added). This

Rule means that the appellant has the option of filing a brief which presents new
arguments that address the "contentions advanced in the respondent's brief." Weisel v.
Beaver Springs Owners Ass'n, Inc., 152 Idaho 519, 525 (2012). That is precisely what

the arguments made in the reply brief did. The State had responded to Mr. Olson's
arguments that the district court's order was erroneous, contending that the hearing was
properly classified as an evidentiary hearing, and argued under the standards for review
of such a hearing that the district court's decision was not erroneous.

(Resp.

Br., pp.9-11.) In his reply brief, Mr. Olson argued against the State's contention that the
June 15, 2012, hearing was an evidentiary hearing, claiming that interpretation of the
record was unreasonable because, if the June 15, 2012, hearing was an evidentiary
hearing, Mr. Olson had been denied his due process rights. (Reply Br., pp.13-16.) As
The State agued directly against Mr. Olson's first argument, that the hearing should be
considered under summary dismissal standards, claiming that the hearing was an
evidentiary hearing, and that the district court's decision was proper under the standard
for review after an evidentiary hearing. (Resp. Br., pp.8-13.) However, it did not
provide a response to Mr. Olson's second argument, regarding the lack of due process
at the hearing if it were an evidentiary hearing. (See generally Resp. Br.) However, the
State's choice to not provide a response in that regard does not mean that it did not
have the opportunity to do so, and all Suitts requires is that the respondent have an
opportunity to respond to the appellant's argument and authorities. Suitts, 141 Idaho at
708.
4
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that argument was rebutting the State's arguments, it was properly made in the reply
brief, pursuant to I.AR. 35(c).
As such, because the Court of Appeals held that it could not consider
Mr. Olson's argument regarding the unreasonableness of viewing the June 15, 2012,
hearing as an evidentiary hearing based on the lack of due process, the Court of
Appeals was delinquent in its duties because it failed to address the actual issues on
appeal. 5

Lovitt, 139 Idaho 322, 328 (2003); see also Saykhamchone v. State, 127

Idaho at 322.

Because of that error, this Court should exercise its review authority.

See, e.g., I.AR. 118(b)(4).

II.
The District Court Erred By Not Affording Mr. Olson Sufficient Time To Discuss
His Potential Claims With Post-Conviction Counsel So That He Might Develop
Them Into Viable Post-Conviction Claims, Which Was The Point Of The Court Of
Appeals' Decision To Remand This Case Following The Initial, Inappropriate
Summary Dismissal Of Those Claims

A

Introduction
In a prior appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the district court's initial order

summarily dismissing Mr. Olson's post-conviction claims because the district court
erroneously dismissed them before deciding whether Mr. Olson deserved the
assistance of counsel. On remand, although counsel was finally appointed, the district

The Court of Appeals did discuss the merits of the claims in dicta in a footnote.
(Opinion, p.4 n.2.) Its discussion, as will be discussed in more detail in Section lll(D),
infra, is erroneous. However, just as an example here, the Court of Appeals concluded
that "the district court allowed [Mr.] Olson an opportunity to present evidence to prove
his allegations." (Opinion, p.4 n.2.) That characterization is erroneous. Mr. Olson was
only allowed to present his own testimony before the district court declared that the
claim would be dismissed; he was not given the opportunity to present additional
evidence or testimony to support his claims.
5
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court did not provide Mr. Olson and his attorney of sufficient time in which to prepare
their case. Therefore, the district court's new dismissal order effectively denied
Mr. Olson the assistance of counsel again, thereby thwarting the purpose of the initial
remand and should be reversed. The case should be remanded for proper proceedings
after Mr. Olson is given sufficient time to consult with the post-conviction counsel.

B.

The District Court Did Not Give Mr. Olson Sufficient Time To Consult With PostConviction Counsel Regarding Viable Post-Conviction Claims, Thereby Depriving
Hirn Of The Assistance Of Post-Conviction Counsel
While there is no constitutional right to post-conviction counsel in Idaho, see,

e.g., Freeman v. State, 131 Idaho 722, 723 (1998), a petitioner claiming post-conviction

relief is entitled to the assistance of counsel when he presents at least one non-frivolous
claim for relief. See, e.g., Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 653-54 (2007). As such, irn
Mr. Olson's first appeal, the Court of Appeals determined that the district court
erroneously summarily dismissed Mr. Olson's petition for post-conviction relief without
first determining whether he was entitled to the assistance of counsel on those claims,
and it remanded the case for evaluation of the motion for appointment of counsel.
Olson II, 2012 Unpublished Opinion No.398, pp.5-6, 9.

The reason behind the Court of Appeals' decision was that "the trial court should
keep in mind that petitions and affidavits filed by a pro se petitioner will often be
conclusory and incomplete. Although facts sufficient to state a claim may not be alleged
because they do not exist, they also may not be alleged because the pro se petitioner
simply does not know what are the essential elements of a claim." Swader, 143 Idaho
at 653-54 (quoting Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 679 (2001 )); Charboneau v. State,
140 Idaho 789, 792-93 (2004).

Therefore, part of post-conviction counsel's job is to
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perfect the initial claims from the original petition, which, as the Idaho Supreme Court
has recognized, may be incomplete in regard to the proof of the elements of the claims.
Swader, 143 Idaho at 653-54; Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792-93. As a result, the Court

of Appeals determined that Mr. Olson's original claims needed to be evaluated for
validity and counsel should have been appointed to help him develop and present those
claims. See Olson II, 2012 Unpublished Opinion No.398, pp.5-6, 9.
On remand, the district court determined that Mr. Olson was entitled to the
assistance of counsel to develop the claims from his original petition. (See R., p.9.) It
did not, however, afford Mr. Olson a sufficient opportunity to discuss his claims with
post-conviction counsel so that counsel could assist him in the prosecution of those
claims. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.4, p.12, L.25 - p.13, L.9; Tr., Vol.4, p.31, L.22 - p.33, L.24.)
Once counsel is appointed in a post-conviction case, he should be afforded sufficient
time to help the petitioner marshal his evidence. See January v. State, 127 Idaho 634,
638 (Ct. App. 1995). The United States Supreme Court has concisely affirmed this
principle: "[t]he defendant needs counsel and counsel needs time." Hawk v. Olson, 326
U.S. 271, 278 (1945).

Therefore, when the petitioner and counsel are not afforded

adequate time to consult or investigate the potential claims, the petitioner is effectively
deprived of the assistance of post-conviction counsel. See id.; see also Brescia v. New
Jersey, 417 U.S. 921, _ , 94 S. Ct. 2630, 2632-33 (1974) (Justices Marshall and

Brennan dissenting from the decision to deny certiorari, discussing the deprivation of
the right to counsel caused by depriving the defendant of an adequate time to prepare
for hearings); cf. January, 127 Idaho at 638 (finding only that the petitioner was not
entitled to relief because there was evidence that he had indicated he had sufficient
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time to prepare for the hearing and had not shown prejudice, not that he did not have
the right to sufficient time to prepare); see also Hall v. State, _

Idaho _ , 2013 WL

6225673, 4-5 (Idaho Dec. 2, 2013) (reaffirming that once a post-conviction petitioner is
afforded counsel, the assistance provided by that counsel needs to be effective), not yet
final.
The need to provide sufficient time for preparation is particularly important in
post-conviction proceedings because of the nature of those proceedings. They are civil
in nature. Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 215, 217 (2009). As such, the petitioner bears
the burden of proving each element of his claims. Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583
(2000). Therefore, part of post-conviction counsel's job is to perfect the initial claims
from the original petition, which, as the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized, may be
incomplete in regard to the proof of the elements of the claims. Swader, 143 Idaho at
653-54; Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792-93. Obviously, in order for counsel to fulfill that
obligation, he must first understand the claims that the petitioner is trying to raise. That
is accomplished by having sufficient time to discuss the claims with the client. Then the
post-conviction attorney needs time to research the claims and gather evidence in
support in order to fulfill his purpose.

Cf. id.

Therefore, post-conviction attorneys

should be provided with sufficient time to prepare their case so they can provide
effective assistance to their clients.
Furthermore, even though there is not a constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel in post-conviction proceedings in Idaho per se, when postconviction counsel is unable to adequately raise and pursue the petitioner's claims, that
deficient performance may deprive the petitioner of a meaningful opportunity to present
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his claims. 6

Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 189 and 189 n.3 (Ct. App. 2008);

Griffin v. State, 142 Idaho 438, 441 (Ct. App. 2006). Therefore, where post-conviction
counsel is unable to perform effectively, it deprives the petitioner of his constitutional
right to due process. Id.; see Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 799, 992 P.2d 789,
794 (Ct. App. 1999) ("[F]ailing to provide a post-conviction applicant with a meaningful
opportunity to have his or her claims presented may be violative of due process."); see

also Hall, 2013 WL 6225673, 4-5 ("This statutory right to counsel would be a hollow
right if it did not guarantee the defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel.")
(quoting Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 833-34 (2009) (quoting Hernandez v. State, 127
Idaho 685, 687 (1995))); Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 136 Idaho 63, 72 (2001)
(quoting Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 91 (1999)) (defining
procedural due process, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, as the right of the
party to be "'provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard.' The opportunity to be
heard must occur 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner' .... ").
First, post-conviction counsel indicated, after the case had been remanded from
the Court of Appeals, he would need ninety days to adequately prepare himself to

6

Despite the distinction, some Idaho opinions have referred to such issues as claims of
"ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel." See, e.g., Baker v. State, 142 Idaho
411, 420 (Ct. App. 2005). As the Idaho Supreme Court has never explicitly adopted a
standard regarding adequate performance of post-conviction counsel in this regard,
Mr. Olson assumes that the Idaho courts would apply the two-part test from
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-91 (1984), requiring him to prove that postconviction counsel's performance fell below a reasonable standard and that he was
prejudiced by that deficient performance.
Inadequate preparation may constitute
unreasonable performance. See, e.g., Roberts v. State, 132 Idaho 494, 496 (1999);
Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 145-46 (Ct. App. 2006). As Mr. Olson's claims were
dismissed without post-conviction counsel's understanding of them due to the district
court's refusal to grant him sufficient time to prepare, Mr. Olson was prejudiced by the
lack of sufficient preparation.
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proceed on the claims in the original petition. (See Tr., Vol.3, p.3, Ls.3-5.) The district
court, however, flatly refused to grant counsel that time.

(Tr., Vol.3, p.3, Ls.6-7.)

Rather, it only gave counsel approximately forty days, even though it was aware of the
other issues on post-conviction counsel's schedule (which included a case set for
trial for the same week as the post-conviction hearing), to prepare for the hearing.
(Tr., Vol.3, p.1, L.1 - p.4, L.15.)

As a result of the district court's decision, post-

conviction counsel was going to be hard-pressed from the outset to be adequately
prepared to assist Mr. Olson in pursuing his claims for post-conviction relief.
The transcript from that hearing, which was held as scheduled on June 15, 2012,
demonstrates that post-conviction counsel did not fully understand Mr. Olson's claims,
nor was he, at that point, able to effectively assist Mr. Olson in the prosecution of those
claims. Counsel informed the district court:
I'm telling the Court that I have investigated this case before and filed a
second amended petition, which I believe had merit, and that case was
fully litigated. So I'm in a position here where I'm trying to do, basically,
follow the mandates of the Appellate Court and this Court in terms of
telling the Court what the claims are. But if you're asking me whether I've
conducted an investigation of claims and believe that the claims have
merit, that's a different matter, and I can't really comment on that, other
than to say that I have -- I have tried to proceed professionally by
providing the appropriate pleadings before, which are not at issue today
before the Court. So that's where I'm at professionally. I feel like I'm kind
of being bound here in the record into asserting things -- half of the merit
of my client [sic] -- when that's not what I've been directed to do. So to the
extent that I can provide assistance to the Court in elucidating what it is he
wants to testify or assert here, I'm happy to do that. 7

The scope of counsel's comments which indicate that he had performed some sort of
investigation in this case is more clearly understood as a product of the procedural
history of this case. This same attorney had been appointed during the initial postconviction proceedings after most of Mr. Olson's claims had been summarily dismissed.
See Olson II, 2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 398, p.2 ("the district court sua sponte
dismissed the original petition as to all claims save that regarding ineffective assistance
of counsel and granted [Mr.] Olson leave to amend regarding that claim only.
7
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(Tr., Vol.4, p.27, L.20 - p.28, L.18 (emphasis added).) The entirety of post-conviction
counsel's comments also demonstrates that counsel felt bound by court order into
asserting certain arguments, and was not fully ready to proceed.
Furthermore, post-conviction counsel's intention for the June 15, 2012, hearing
was "to put Mr. Olson on the stand and have him go through basically the original
petition ... have Mr. Olson testify as to what kind of a basis he has for each one of
those claims." 8 (Tr., Vol.4, p.11, L.19 - p.12, L.24.) The point of doing that, according to
post-conviction counsel, was to assist the district court "in elucidating what it is

[Mr. Olson] wants to ... assert here." (Tr., Vol.4, p.28, Ls.15-18 (emphasis added).)
Post-conviction counsel's lack of full understanding of Mr. Olson's claims was also
[Mr.] Olson filed a response and again requested appointment of counsel, which the
district court granted.") The amended petition which post-conviction counsel filed
addressed only the claims which had not been summarily dismissed. (See R., Vol.1,
p.100.) As such, the record indicates that counsel would have had no reason to
investigate the claims that had already been summarily dismissed (which are being
argued in this appeal), and it does not indicate that counsel exceeded the limited scope
of his appointment.
8 Post-conviction counsel later added:
[M]y understanding of how to prepare for today is that we go through and
have Mr. Olson testify as to what kind of a basis he has for each one of
those claims. And in that regard that's what I'm prepared to do today with
regard to his testimony. Of course my client has indicated he'd like more
time to prepare, but I told -- I told the client that based upon my
understanding of what the Court's instructions were today, if there is
something that develops from this hearing in his testimony, and the
State -- the Court is going to give the State additional time to brief it or
submit additional evidence, we would ask for the same time to respond or
present a response to that. But, in general, I think as far as I understood
the Court's desire to move forward in terms of developing evidence today,
I'm prepared to do that.
(Tr., Vol.4, p.12, L.19 - p.13, L.13 (emphasis added).) Counsel clearly qualified his
assertion that he was ready to proceed, asserting that all he was prepared to do was
allow Mr. Olson the opportunity to try and explain his allegations.
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demonstrated by his attempts to summarize those claims at the district court's request,
which led to the district court's determination that "[w]ell, perhaps we ought to just go
ahead and hear [Mr. Olson's] position on each of these matters and I can hear it out."

(See Tr., Vol. 4, p.18 L.6 - p.28, L.21; compare, p.31, L.8 - p.94, L.22 (Mr. Olson's
clarifications of his claims)).
To that end, the only legal support offered on any of the claims had
to be provided by Mr. Olson, not post-conviction counsel. 9 (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.4, p.72,
L.25 - p.74, L.6; see generally Tr., Vol.4.) Most of the time, it was Mr. Olson, not postconviction counsel, making the arguments in support of the claims.

(See generally

Tr., Vol.4.) The result is that Mr. Olson was essentially left to fend for himself in regard
to his claims for post-conviction relief.

In fact, counsel told the court that he did not

believe he was required to offer any more assistance to Mr. Olson: "I feel like I'm kind
of being bound here in the record into asserting things -- half the merit of my client [sic] - when that's not what I've been directed to do."

(See Tr., Vol.4, p.28, Ls.10-14.)

Therefore, counsel's actions at that hearing demonstrate that Mr. Olson was not
afforded the meaningful opportunity to pursue his claims or the effective assistance of
post-conviction counsel. See, e.g., Schwartz, 145 Idaho at 189 n.3; Hall,_ P.3d _ ,
2013 WL 6225673, 4-5.
There is no need to show specific prejudice in this case because it is not possible
to know what claims would have been pursued, much less the result of those claims,
had Mr. Olson actually been meaningful afforded the assistance of counsel.

9

Mr. Olson admitted that his research had not been particularly effective because
he did not have access to sufficient information to provide more. (Tr., Vol.4, p.80,
L.23 - p.81, L.1.)
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Regardless, since the point of post-conviction counsel is to assist the petitioner in
pursuing valid claims for relief, the fact that Mr. Olson was deprived of the assistance of
counsel itself shows prejudice. However, if there is a need for a specific showing of
prejudice, as will be discussed in detail in Section Ill, infra, Mr. Olson did articulate one
genuine issue of material fact, meaning he had a valid claim for post-conviction relief.
There was also the possibility that, with the effective assistance of post-conviction
counsel, he could have raised a second valid issue, which is discussed in detail in note
11, infra. Therefore, the deprivation of the assistance of counsel prejudiced Mr. Olson.
Mr. Olson is not arguing for a conclusion that, as a matter of law, forty-three days
is insufficient time to prepare for a hearing. Rather, he is arguing that the continuance
should have been granted because the unique facts of this case demonstrate that
counsel was unprepared to proceed on June 15, 2012. The effect of forcing Mr. Olson
to proceed when his counsel was clearly unable to assist him deprived Mr. Olson of his
right to effective assistance of counsel.

111.
The District Court Erroneously Summarily Dismissed Mr. Olson's Petition For
Post-Conviction Relief In The Face Of At Least One Genuine Issue Of Material Fact
A.

Introduction
When the petitioner in post-conviction raises a genuine issue of material fact

which, if resolved in his favor, makes summary dismissal of the claim in question
inappropriate; that claim must be litigated at an evidentiary hearing.

In this case,

Mr. Olson's petition, with the clarifications he made at the June 15, 2012, hearing,
raised a genuine issue of material fact - that his guilty plea had been premised on the
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promise made by his first trial attorney regarding the sentence he would receive. This,
Mr. Olson asserted, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.

Nevertheless, the

district court summarily dismissed that claim. This Court should reverse that decision
and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing.

B.

Mr. Olson Raised A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact And Is Entitled To An
Evidentiary Hearing
With the benefit Mr. Olson's explanations of his claims at the June 15, 2012,

hearing, his petition for post conviction relief raised the possibility of at least one valid
claim - his claim in Issue B, that his decision to plead guilty was premised on a promise
made by trial counsel. 10

When there are genuine issues of material fact which, if

resolved in his favor, would entitle him to relief, "an evidentiary hearing must be
conducted." Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153 (2008) (emphasis added); Berg v.
State, 131 Idaho 517, 518 (1998).

There was the possibility that, had post-conviction counsel been afforded a sufficient
amount of time to discuss the issues with Mr. Olson, so that he understood the claims
Mr. Olson was trying to pursue, counsel could have amended other of those initial
statements into valid claims for post-conviction relief.
For example, in Issue C, Mr. Olson had initially alleged that the State had
withheld exculpatory evidence regarding a potential witness. (Tr., Vol.4, p.53, Ls.18-23;
R., Vol.1, p.6.) However, at the June 15, 2012, hearing, Mr. Olson explained that the
claim actually centered around his initial trial attorney's failure to investigate the
potential witness, who, according to Mr. Olson, would be able to offer testimony which
would undermine the reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop. (Tr., Vol.4, p.54,
Ls.3-23.) However, Mr. Olson's offer of proof only indicated that the witness would be
able to testify that Mr. Olson swerved into the opposite lane to avoid an accident that
would have been caused by the other driver, not that the officer who initiated the traffic
stop saw any of this occur. (See Tr., Vol.4, p.54, Ls.3-23.) Nevertheless, had the issue
been reframed by post-conviction counsel, after being given a sufficient opportunity to
investigate the claim after gaining this proper understanding of the issue, there is the
potential for a valid claim in that regard. Thus, the development of Issue C further
demonstrates the prejudice caused by the district court's decisions, which deprived
Mr. Olson and his post-conviction attorney of a sufficient time to coordinate his postconviction claims.
10

23

When testifying about Issue B during the June 15, 2012, hearing, Mr. Olson
asserted that his decision to plead guilty was premised, in part, on his first trial
attorney's promise that he would be sentenced to a fixed term of two to three years and
an indeterminate term of life, and that this sentence would be ordered to run
concurrently with his other sentence from a different case. (Tr., Vol.4, p.39, L.21 - p.40,
L.2.)
A guilty plea, if induced by promises or threats which deprive it of the
character of a voluntary act, is void .... Certainly, if an attorney recklessly
promises his client that a specific sentence will follow upon a guilty
plea, ... the question may arise whether such assurances were coercive,
or whether such representation may be deemed constitutionally
ineffective.
Wellnitz v. Page, 420 F.2d 935, 936 (10th Cir. 1970) (citations omitted); see
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 137 (2009) (holding that, when a promise
induces the defendant to plead guilty and that promise is not met, the defendant is
entitled to some form of relief); State v. Doe, 138 Idaho 409, 410 (Ct. App. 2003)
(same); see a/so State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 257 (2012) (adopting the rationale
from Puckett in regard to plea agreements and promises made therein). Additionally,
where the petitioner alleged that a promise had induced him to plead guilty, absent any
additional evidence, the United States Supreme Court has held "[t]here can be no doubt
that, if the allegations contained in the petitioner's motion and affidavit are true, he is
entitled to have his sentence vacated." Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493
(1962). Therefore, if the claim made in Issue B - that trial counsel promised Mr. Olson
what sentence he would receive if he pied guilty - were resolved in Mr. Olson's favor,
he would be entitled to relief. See Puckett, 556 U.S. at 136; Machibroda, 368 U.S. at
493; Gomez, 153 Idaho at 257; see a/so Wellnitz, 420 F.2d at 936.
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The district court relied on the guilty plea questionnaire Mr. Olson filled out to
dismiss Issue B. (See Tr., Vol.4, p.43, L.2 - p.44, L.3.) The questionnaire, however,
was not complete. 11

Mr. Olson also responded to the question "Have any other

promises been made to you which have influenced your decision to plead guilty," with
the answer, "Yes." (R., Vol.1 p.74.) The reason, Mr. Olson wrote, was that the State
refused to negotiate. 12

(R., Vol.1, p.74.)

Despite these issues, the district court

accepted the questionnaire without asking any follow up questions. (See generally Tr.
Vol.6, pp.1-9.) And, actually, the answers in the questionnaire support Mr. Olson's postconviction claims.

(See R., Vol.1, pp.71-77.)

For example, at the June 15, 2012,

hearing, Mr. Olson explained his attorney promised he would receive a concurrent
sentence with two to three years fixed, life indeterminate if he pied guilty, even without
the State's agreement. (Tr., Vol.4, p.39, L.19 - p.44, L.3.) Therefore, the questionnaire,
which indicates that the plea was being entered in response to a promise, offers proof to
support Mr. Olson's claim in Issue B.

It certainly does not conclusively disprove

Mr. Olson's claim. Therefore, summary dismissal of Issue B was inappropriate.

11

Mr. Olson also did not answer any of the questions on the guilty plea questionnaire
regarding the nature of the plea agreement, or the question about whether it was a
conditional plea. (R., Vol.1, pp.73-74.) He did, however, indicate on the guilty plea
questionnaire that there was nothing additional he had requested his attorney do,
including filing motions, and that there were no other witnesses who would show his
innocence. (R., Vol.1, pp.71-77.)
12 Mr. Olson ultimately clarified that the first of his two trial attorneys had promised him
he would receive a sentence with two to three years fixed, life indeterminate, concurrent
with another sentence he was already serving. (Tr., Vol.4, p.39, L.21 - p.40, L.2.)
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C.

The District Court's Decision Is Properly Reviewed Under The Standards Of
Summary Dismissal
The district court's decisions to dismiss the claims at the June 15, 2012, hearing

are properly classified as summary dismissals, not denials after an evidentiary hearing.
No other witnesses were called to contest Mr. Olson's statements in support of his
claims, made under oath. (See generally Tr., Vol.4.) In fact, the district court actually
said at the hearing, that it "dismissed" most of the individual claims. (See, e.g., Tr.,
Vol.4, p.60, L.6; p.64, L.18; p.67, Ls.1-2; p.75, Ls.16-17; p.81, L.20; p.85, L.1; p.87,
L.14; p.89, Ls.3-4; p.90, L.9.) At the end of the hearing, it stated, "[t]he petition then will
be dismissed in its entirety." (Tr., Vol.4, p.96, L.25 - p.97, L.1 (emphasis added).) The
district court had indicated during the hearing that it was not an evidentiary hearing: the
purpose of proceeding with the June 15, 2012 hearing, even though Mr. Olson had not
had enough time to prepare, was to narrow down which issues would be pursued on
remand. (Tr., Vol.4, p.18, Ls.6-7.) As such, the district court told counsel "Here's what
the Court's going to order in this case ... I think the Court of Appeals either wanted to
give Mr. Olson an opportunity to either present legal argument upon or evidence upon
or to amend. And so I'm going to -- I want to go through what is going to be pursued by
Mr. Olson today, and then what we're going to do is set this at a later date." (Tr., Vol.4,
p.17, L.7-17 (emphasis added).) As a result, the only notice given to Mr. Olson was that
he would be able to clarify his claims and proceed on those that had not already been
addressed or which he decided he no longer wished to pursue. (See Tr., Vol.4, p.11,
L.19 - p.12, L.24; Tr., Vol.4, p.28, Ls.15-18.) Issues that he still wanted to pursue would
be taken up at a future time.

(Tr., Vol.4, p.17, Ls.16-17.) Therefore, this hearing is

more properly described as a hearing regarding summary dismissal, not an evidentiary
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hearing. 13 Summary dismissal of claims presenting genuine issues of material fact is
impermissible; an evidentiary hearing must be held. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153; Berg,
131 ldahoat518.

D.

The June 15, 2012, Hearing Could Not Have Been An Evidentiary Hearing,
Because, If It Were, Mr. Olson Would Not Have Been Afforded The Necessary
Procedural Due Process Protections, Or, Alternatively, He Would Have Been
Entitled To Post-Conviction Relief
In addition to the fact that the substance of the hearing demonstrates that the

June 15, 2012, hearing was a hearing on summary dismissal, it would be unreasonable
to conclude that it was an evidentiary hearing because, if it were an evidentiary hearing,
the necessary due process protections would not have been afforded to Mr. Olson.
Procedural due process requires that "there must be some process to
ensure that the individual is not arbitrarily deprived of his rights in violation
of the state or federal constitutions. This requirement is met when the
defendant is provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard." The
opportunity to be heard must occur "at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner" in order to satisfy the due process requirement.
Aberdeen-Springfield Canal, 133 Idaho at 91 (quoting State v. Rhoades, 121 Idaho

63, 72 (1991); Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 923, 927 (1998)); see also
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550-52 (1965). Since the district court asserted at

the May 2, 2012, status hearing that its intent for the June 15, 2012, hearing was to

Even if the district court's description of the June 15, 2012, hearing as an evidentiary
hearing is correct, that simply adds to the harm done by depriving Mr. Olson of sufficient
time to prepare. His post-conviction counsel would have gone into an evidentiary
hearing without knowing what claims were being raised and pursued, and therefore, it is
difficult to say that post-conviction counsel was adequately prepared to proceed with
such a hearing. Since inadequate preparation indicates the attorney's performance was
deficient, see, e.g., Roberts, 132 Idaho at 496; Murphy, 143 Idaho at 145-46, classifying
the June 15, 2012, hearing as an evidentiary hearing only reinforces the need to
remand this case for a proper hearing held after Mr. Olson is afforded sufficient time to
prepare.
13
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allow the defendant to overcome summary judgment, and if he was successful, the case
would be set for an evidentiary hearing (see Tr., Vol.3, p.1, L.19 - p.2, L.1), allowing it to
subsequently change the June 15, 2012, hearing into a full-fledged evidentiary hearing,
as the State contends, would have deprived Mr. Olson of effective notice.

See

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); State v. Doe,
147 Idaho 542, 545-47 (Ct. App. 2009) (applying Mullane to find that the defendant had
not been given notice of part of the purpose of the hearing).
Even assuming Mr. Olson would have been provided with sufficient notice, the
procedures employed at that the June 15, 2012, hearing would have deprived Mr. Olson
of a full, fair, and meaningful opportunity to argue his case if it were an evidentiary
hearing. See Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 550-52; see also Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co.,
133 Idaho at 91; Castaneda, 130 Idaho at 927. The district court only heard Mr. Olson's
testimony as to the basis for his allegations.

(See generally Tr., Vol.4; see, e.g.,

Tr., Vol.4, p.64, L.20 - p.67, L.2.) After he offered his explanation for each allegation,
the district court ruled on that particular claim. It did not give him the opportunity after
he had finished offering his testimony to offer additional evidence in support of his
claims. 14 Since he was not given the opportunity to present evidence besides his own
testimony in support of his position (see generally Tr., Vol.4, pp.31-97), the hearing

Presumably, if Mr. Olson had been sufficiently put on notice that this was an
evidentiary hearing, he would have objected to this procedure. However, as counsel
asserted, he did not believe the hearing was to be an evidentiary hearing, and so had
no reason to make such an objection. (See Tr., Vol.4, p.12, L.19 - p.13, L.13 ("[M]y
understanding of how to prepare for today is that we go through and have Mr. Olson
testify as to what kind of a basis he has for each one of those claims .... I think as far
as I understood the Court's desire to move forward in terms of developing evidence
today, I'm prepared to do that.").) As it is, this further demonstrates why, if this were an
evidentiary hearing, Mr. Olson would not have received sufficient notice.
14

28

would not have been a full hearing, nor would it have provided Mr. Olson with a

meaningful opportunity to argue his case. Since, if the June 15, 2012, hearing was an
evidentiary hearing, it would have violated Mr. Olson's procedural due process rights,
the only logical conclusion is that the June 15, 2012, hearing was not an evidentiary
hearing.
Even if this Court determines that the June 15, 2012, hearing was an evidentiary
hearing, the district court's order is still erroneous because Mr. Olson met his burden of
proof at that hearing. When a post-conviction claim goes to an evidentiary hearing, the
petitioner has the burden to prove his claims by a preponderance of the evidence.

See, e.g., Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56 (2004); Cooke v. State, 149 Idaho 233, 244
(Ct. App. 2010).

The preponderance of the evidence standard means that the

evidence, "when weighed with that opposed to it, has more convincing force and from
which it results that the greater probability of truth lies therein."

Big Butte Ranch,

Inc. v. Grasmick, 91 Idaho 6, 9 n.2 (1966); see also Oxley v. Medicine Rock Specialties,
Inc., 139 Idaho 476, 481 (2003) ("A preponderance of the evidence means that when
weighing all of the evidence in the record, the evidence on which the finder of fact relies
is more probably true than not."); In re Beyer, _

P.3d _ , 2013 Opinion No.32, p.5

(Ct. App. 2013) ("A preponderance of the evidence means that the evidence shows
something to be more probably true than not."). Mr. Olson offered unrefuted testimony
in support of his claims for post-conviction relief. (See generally Tr., Vol.4, pp.31-97.)
The State presented nothing to weigh against that evidence.
contends that he would have met his burden of proof.
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Therefore, Mr. Olson

For example, in regard to Issue 8, Mr. Olson testified that his attorney promised
that, if he pleaded guilty, he would be sentenced to a fixed term of two to three
years, life indeterminate, to run concurrently with his other sentence. (Tr., Vol.4, p.39,
L.21 - p.40, L.2.) The State offered no testimony to rebut that assertion. (See generally
Tr.; R.) Nor does, as the district court asserted, the guilty plea questionnaire contradict
his claim. (See Tr., Vol.4, p.43, L.2 - p.44, L.3.) Rather, the questionnaire shows that
Mr. Olson responded "yes," to the question about whether he had been promised a
sentence in exchange for his plea. (R., Vol.1, p.74.) The district court did not inquire
about that response before accepting the guilty plea. (See generally Tr., Vol.6, pp.1-9.)
As a result, the only explanations for that answer were Mr. Olson's comment on the
questionnaire (that the State would not negotiate in that regard (R., Vol.1, p.74)), and
his testimony at the June 15, 2012, hearing (that his attorney promised a particular
sentence (Tr., Vol.4, p.39, L.19 - p.44, L.3)). That is the only evidence in the record on
that issue. As such, the preponderance of the evidence presented in this case would
make it more likely that Mr. Olson's trial attorney promised him the sentence he would
receive, thereby invalidating the guilty plea. See Puckett, 556 U.S. at 137; Machibroda,
368 U.S. at 493; Gomez, 153 Idaho at 257; see also Wellnitz, 420 F.2d at 936. As
such, if this was an evidentiary hearing, Mr. Olson is entitled to post-conviction relief on
this issue.
Because the only logical conclusion is that the June 15, 2012, hearing was held
for summary judgment purposes, and because the district court erroneously summarily
dismissed claims raising genuine issues of material fact, this case should be remanded
for an actual evidentiary hearing on those claims. Alternatively, the district court's order
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should be reversed and the case remanded for the district court to enter an order
granting Mr. Olson the post-conviction relief to which he is entitled.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Olson respectfully requests that this Court grant review in this case.

On

review, he respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief and remand this case for further
proceedings.
DATED this 2yth day of January, 2014.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

31

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2ih day of January, 2014, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR
REVIEW, by causing to be placed a copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
LAWRENCE J OLSON
INMATE #39597
ICC
PO BOX 70010
BOISE ID 83707
MICHAEL R MCLAUGHLIN
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRIEF
JOSEPH L ELLSWORTH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
PO BOX 83720
BOISE ID 83720-0010
Hand deliver to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court

EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
BRD/eas

32

